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Two Conceptions of Logical Form 
Guido Bonino, Torino 
1. The Picture Theory of Language 
In this paper a brief presentation of Wittgenstein’s picture 
theory of language is provided, as it is put forth in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Then some conclusions 
are drawn with reference to the notion of logical form; in 
particular, two different conceptions of logical form are 
expounded, and one of them is shown to be untenable. 
Two are the features of the picture theory which interest 
us here. The first is the automatism of sense, i.e. the idea 
that, once the referents of the names occurring in a 
proposition are fixed, then the sense of the proposition is 
automatically determined. That also means that when we 
know what the names occurring in a proposition refer to, 
we automatically grasp the sense of the proposition itself: 
no other piece of information is required. 
The other central tenet of Wittgenstein’s picture theory is 
the idea that a picture and the fact which is pictured must 
share the same pictorial form. Let us consider the case of 
an elementary proposition and the fact that is pictured by 
it. In both the proposition and the fact we can distinguish a 
matter and a form. The matter of the proposition may be 
said to consist of the names occurring in it; the matter of 
the pictured fact consists of its objects. The form is the 
pictorial form, which in this case is the logical form. 
According to what Wittgenstein says, we must regard the 
two forms as being identical, i.e. literally the same form. As 
to matter, it is obvious that the matter of the proposition is 
not the same as the matter of the pictured fact (names 
stand for objects, but they are not the objects themselves): 
names and objects are correlated by the projective 
relation. We could say that according to the picture theory 
the form is common to propositions and pictured facts, 
while the matter, as it is different, must be correlated 
through a process of projection. All that does not concern 
only logical pictures. In every picture we can distinguish a 
matter (which is projected) and a form (which is identical). 
In the case of pictures whose pictorial form is not the 
logical one, the process of abstraction has been stopped 
before reaching its highest level, that is to say, some of the 
aspects which could be treated as matter (i.e. projected) 
are – on the contrary – included in form (which must be 
identical). That means taking advantage of some of the 
features of the picture which are identical to some of the 
features of the pictured fact. In spatial pictures, for in-
stance, some of the spatial relations holding between the 
picture’s elements are identical with the spatial relations 
holding between the objects of the spatial pictured fact. 
The two features are closely connected. Since the mat-
ter of the proposition and that of the pictured fact are 
distinct, in order to understand the proposition we must 
know what the names occurring in the proposition refer to. 
But there is only one form, shared by the proposition and 
the pictured fact, so that we do not need any further piece 
of information concerning an analogous correlation 
between two distinct forms. The identity of the form 
guarantees the automatism of sense. 
2. Poor and Rich Conception  
of Logical Form 
Coming to the notion of logical form, two main conceptions 
are available, which I will call the “poor” conception and 
the “rich” conception. In the Tractatus an elementary fact 
consists of the combining of (simple) objects. According to 
the poor conception of logical form, only one mode of 
combination among objects is admitted: objects can only 
be combined or not combined; the logical form reduces to 
the possibility of being combined or not being combined of 
the objects. In fact the notion of logical form – or the form 
of reality – is introduced by Wittgenstein as the most 
abstract pictorial form of all, i.e. as the pictorial form which 
every picture must have in common with all facts. And 
since pictures themselves are facts, the logical form is 
what all facts have in common, i.e. their consisting in the 
being combined of some objects. A brief digression is 
necessary here with reference to the question of order. 
Given the objects a, R and b – where R is a non-symmetric 
relation –, they can give rise to two different facts: aRb and 
bRa. There is no explicit dealing with the question of order 
in the extremely abstract views of the Tractatus, and the 
whole issue will be left aside here. In what follows it will be 
assumed that no question of order arises, so that – if there 
is only one mode of combination –, given a list of objects, 
only one fact can be constructed. 
According to the rich conception of logical form, given a 
list of simple objects, apart from questions of order, several 
modes of combination are available, so that different 
(elementary) facts can be constructed. Such modes of 
combination do not belong to the matter – they are some-
thing “additional” with respect to objects –, nor can they be 
resolved by further analysis into more complex structures 
of simpler objects, since by definition we are already at the 
level of simple objects. Thus the different modes of 
combination must somehow be absorbed into the form, 
and that is the reason why I speak of a “rich” conception of 
logical form. Those who hold such a “rich” conception 
usually admit that the form of reality is the mere possibility 
of being combined; yet they countenance different modes 
of combination. It seems to me that there are no alterna-
tives: either the different modes of combination belong to 
the “matter” of reality, or they belong to its form. In the 
former case we have a “poor” conception of the form itself, 
in the latter we have a “rich” conception. 
A good illustration of the whole question can be set forth 
by making reference to Sellars [1962], in which a compari-
son is made with Bergmann [1960] (cf. also Bergmann 
[1963]). In his paper Sellars compares two languages, 
which we will call “Sellars-language” and “Bergmann-
language”. Let us assume that the proposition “a is larger 
than b” is elementary, i.e. that the relation larger than does 
not arise out of complex configurations of objects, but it 
belongs to the form of reality – if a (rich) nominalistic view 
is adopted –, or it is an object – if a realistic view is 
adopted. In Sellars-language the proposition in question 
will be written, say, as “a b”. The relation larger than, which 
belongs to the form of reality, is symbolized by the relative 
spatial positions of the names “a” and “b”. In the Berg-
mann-language the same proposition will be written as 
“aLb” or “L (a, b)”. 
Two Conceptions of Logical Form - Guido Bonino 
 
 
 48
Now we have to compare the kinds of behaviour of the 
two languages with respect to the picture theory. The 
proposition “a is larger than b” is written in Bergmann-
language as “aLb”. If we know what the names “a”, “b” and 
“L” stand for, we do not need to know anything else in 
order to understand the proposition. In fact the objects for 
which the names stand can be combined in only one way 
(they can be combined or not combined). The simple 
juxtaposition of the names in the proposition has enough 
expressive power to reproduce such a one-mode combi-
nation. The proposition and the pictured fact literally share 
the same form, which is the form of reality (the possibility 
of being combined or not). Let us now consider the case in 
which universals are not included among objects and the 
form of reality (which is also the logical form) is conceived 
of as being “rich”. That is the case illustrated by Sellars-
language. The proposition “a is larger than b” is written in 
Sellars-language as “a b”. Here the only names are “a” and 
“b”. According to the thesis of the automatism of sense, 
once we know what the two names refer to, we must 
automatically grasp the sense of the proposition. That 
should happen thanks to the identity of logical form: the 
relative spatial positions of “a” and “b” should somehow 
indicate that the objects referred to by “a” and “b” stands in 
the relation larger than to one another. Because of the 
richness of the form, simple juxtaposition is not enough: 
we must consider in what relations the symbols “a” and “b” 
stand to one another. In fact the propositions “a is redder 
than b” should be written in Sellars-language, say, as “b 
a”, where the different spatial relation holding between “a” 
and “b” indicates that the objects referred to by these 
names are combind in a different way from that in which 
the objects of the previous proposition are combined. But 
now it does not seem that merely knowing what objects the 
names stand for is enough to grasp the sense of the 
proposition. Another piece of information is required, 
concerning the correlation between the modes of combi-
nation of the names in the propositions and the modes of 
combination of the objects to which they refer. In the case 
of Sellars-language many correlations are possible, and 
that makes it difficult to understand in what sense the 
relations between symbols could be regarded as identical 
with those between objects: a stipulation seems to be 
necessary, and we must know such a stipulation in order 
to grasp the sense of the proposition. Thus it seems that 
the automatism of sense cannot be preserved if we admit 
a rich form of reality. 
3. Reasons Underlying  
the Two Interpretations 
The difficulties met with by the rich conception of form may 
be regarded as deriving from a wrong delimitation between 
matter and form. If in order to grasp the sense of a propo-
sition we must know what the correlation between the 
modes of combination of names and those of objects is, 
that means that these modes of combination do not really 
belong to the form, but to the matter, and that their corre-
lation must be seen as a projection. Coming back to 
Sellars-language, if we draw a new delimitation between 
matter and form according to what has been said so far, 
the spatial relations holding between “a” and “b” in “a b” 
and “b a” should be regarded as being themselves names. 
At first sight that could seem rather odd, since it is difficult 
to imagine that a name may consist not of a linguistic 
expression, but of a relation between linguistic expressions 
(cf. Frascolla [2000]). Yet, if one considers what has just 
been said about the picture theory, there does not seem to 
be any reason not to regard these relations as names: 
since a correlation is required between them and what 
they stand for, they are on a par with “a” and “b” with 
regard to the need for a projection. Once the necessity of a 
projection is recognized, no piece of information is missing 
any more in order to grasp automatically the sense of the 
proposition. The new interpretation of Sellars-language 
makes it wholly equivalent to Bergmann-language: both in 
“aLb” and in “a b” we can discern three names (for similar 
considerations on Sellars-language cf. Hochberg [2001]). 
It must be noticed that this interpretation is not neces-
sarily realistic. It is true that names are assumed which 
stand for relations. Yet it must be considered that projec-
tion has directly to do only with what distinguishes the 
relation larger than from the relation redder than; their 
common formal aspects are still contained in the form. 
What has been said does not really concern the opposition 
between nominalism and realism, but rather that between 
poor and rich conception of logical form. The error lies in 
thinking that there may be a correlation of forms alongside 
the correlation of names to objects, so that what really 
depends on a projection between names and objects is 
relocated in forms. But thus forms are loaded with different 
modes of combination, and since the necessity of a 
projection between these modes and those of the objects 
belonging to the pictured fact is not explicitly recognized, a 
lack of information occurs, and the automatism of sense is 
not secured any more. All that is associated with a confu-
sion between the functional notion of (pictorial) form, as 
opposed to matter, and the absolute notion of logical form 
(which is the form of reality). The existence of an ultimate 
level of analysis, where only absolutely simple objects and 
logical form are envisaged, is required – according to 
Wittgenstein – by the determinateness of sense. Now, 
thinking that the different modes of combination (what 
differentiates the different spatial relations between “a” and 
“b” in Sellars-language and the relations larger than and 
redder than) belong to the logical form seems to depend 
on the idea that, since they may belong to a pictorial form 
(which, however, is not the logical one!), they can never 
belong to the matter of representation; and if they can 
never belong to matter, at any level of representation, then 
they must belong to logical form. The same confusion may 
occur in the case of pictures whose pictorial form is not the 
logical one. Let us take the example of musical notation 
and music. Instead of identifying the pictorial form with the 
logical one (thus considering what differentiates the spatial 
structure of the picture and the pitch-structure of the 
pictured fact as belonging to the matter of representation), 
one could regard both structures as belonging to the form 
of representation. In that case a correspondence is 
substituted for the identity of form, and the automatism of 
sense breaks down. In this way, something which in 
certain cases of representation could belong to the 
pictorial form (functional notion) is regarded as always 
belonging to form, as if that did not depend on the particu-
lar circumstances. 
It seems to me that one of the reasons underlying this 
approach is a nominalistic bias. Since in Wittgenstein’s 
examples pictorial forms take advantage of identity 
between relations, or more generally between universals, 
then it is concluded that relations naturally belong to form, 
independently of the choice of the pictorial form. Thus 
universals are included in forms, and only particulars are 
regarded as being capable of occurring in matter. Of 
course what distinguishes universals from each other 
could be analyzed as emerging from configurations of 
objects, but this analysis demands a preliminary step, i.e. 
placing universals into matter. Since this step is not made, 
we are left with rich forms. But rich forms have some 
problems with the automatism of sense. The arbitrariness 
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of this approach may be shown by the fact that it is 
possible to imagine a “language” in which the form is made 
up by particulars, whereas the matter is made up by 
universals. In a picture of this “language”, the fact that a 
certain particular a stands in a certain relation to the 
particular b would represent the fact that the very same 
object a stands in a different relation to the very same 
object b. Presumably such a language would not be very 
handy, but it is possible to imagine some examples: the 
fact that Smith makes a certain characteristic gesture with 
his hand near Jones’ throat may mean that Smith cuts 
Jones’ throat. Of course nothing like that is envisaged in 
the Tractatus. The example only shows that particulars 
and universals seem to be on a par with respect to the 
matter/form distinction of the picture theory. 
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